Abstract-We present four lower bounds on the mean squared error of both frequency and distribution estimation under Local Differential Privacy (LDP). Each of these bounds is stated in a different mathematical 'language', making them all interesting in their own right. Two are particularly important: First, for a given LDP protocol, we give formulas for the optimal frequency and distribution estimators for the aggregator. This theoretically 'solves' the issue of postprocessing, although it may be computationally infeasible in practice. We present methods to approximate the optimal estimator, yielding an estimator that outperforms state of the art methods. Second, we give a lower bound on MSE in terms of the LDP parameter ε, giving a quantitative statement of the privacy-utility tradeoff in LDP. In the high privacy domain, this improves on existing results by giving tighter constants even where earlier results consider a worstcase error metric, or giving constants where up to now, no constants were known.
Introduction
In a context where a data aggregator collects potentially sensitive data, there is an inherent tension between the aggregator's desire to obtain accurate population statistics and the individuals' desire to protect their private data. One approach to protect privacy is offered by Local Differential Privacy (LDP) protocols [12] . Under this framework, each user randomises his private data before sending it to the aggregator. This hides the users' true data, while for a large population size the randomness of the users cancels out, allowing the aggregator to obtain accurate estimates of the population statistics. Because of these properties, LDP-mechanisms are widely used in industry by companies such as Apple [1] , Google [9] , and Microsoft [6] .
One of the main settings in which LDP protocols are used is that of frequency estimation [9] , [16] , [18] . In this setting, every user has a private data item from a (finite) set A, and the aggregator's goal is to determine the frequencies of the elements of A among the user population. There is a tradeoff between user privacy and frequency estimation accuracy. Intuitively, the more 'random' the privacy protocol is, the better it will hide an individual's private data, but the more noisy the aggregator's estimations will be. Therefore, it is natural to ask the following question: Question 1.1. Given an LDP protocol Q, what is the frequency estimation error for the aggregator?
The answer depends on a number of factors. The first of these is the metric used to assess estimation error; throughout this paper we consider the mean squared error (MSE), as this is an often-used metric in the literature [8] , [16] , [17] . Second, the answer will depend on the number of users: the more users, the more the random noise induced by Q will 'cancel out', leading to better estimations. The total error over all data items naturally also depends on a = #A.
Furthermore, the estimation depends on the frequency estimator used by the aggregator. LDP protocols in the literature typically come with unbiased frequency estimators [9] , [16] , [18] . These estimators, however, often yield negative frequency estimations, or estimations that do not add up to 1. While one can improve the accuracy of the estimation by postprocessing these estimations, there are many ways to do so, and it is not clear what the optimal postprocessing method is for general Q and input distribution [17] . Nevertheless, the most promising approaches depend crucially on prior expectations of properties of the input distribution. Input distributions typically follow a power law, and fitting a power law distribution to the data results in a reduced estimation error [10] . Furthermore, input distributions typically have many zero frequencies; by converting all small (and negative) estimations to 0, one can reduce the estimation error [17] .
Setting the issue of estimator choice aside, the question remains what properties of Q play a role in the estimation error. Of particular importance is the LDP privacy parameter ε, which is a positive real number measuring the worst-case leakage of the protocol. It is known that for a large number of users n, and small ε, the error is at best proportional to na ε 2 [3] , [7] , and protocols have been found that achieve this asymptotic rate [7] , [16] . Nevertheless, depending on the precise method of estimation, the constant factor of the lower bound is either unknown or far from what has been achieved in practice.
Our contributions
In this paper, we consider two different, but related estimation problems: where the aggregator wants to estimate the probability distribution P from which the users' private data is drawn, and where the aggregator wants to estimate the actual tallies T of the private data. The main contribution of this paper is to answer Question 1.1 by giving four lower bounds for the accuracy of estimators under LDP, for a given privacy protocol, for both of these problems. As we get down the list, we get lower bounds that are progressively less tight, but easier to compute. Each of these lower bounds is stated in a different mathematical 'language', making them all interesting in their own right. We have the following lower bounds:
Optimal estimators: We formalise the approach of incorporating prior information to improve estimator accuracy [10] , [17] . This allows us to find, for a given protocol and a given prior distribution of P , the distribution and tally estimation that minimises the average mean squared error (Theorem 3.1). Unfortunately, these can be computationally expensive in practice, but we show that they can be approximated by the MLE. We also assess the accuracy of the MLE estimator in practice, showing that it outperforms state of the art techniques [17] . Information theory: We give a lower bound of estimator accuracy in terms of the a posteriori entropy of P and T (Theorem 4.1). This relates information-theoretical metrics of protocol utility to an operational one. Linear algebra: Expanding the work on the limit behaviour of information-theoretical utility [13] , we find lower bounds for estimator accuracy that hold for asymptotically large n (Corollary 5.2). These are expressed in terms of matrices associated to the LDP protocol. These lower bounds do not depend on the number of users, and as such can be computed more easily. LDP parameter ε: Again expanding on [13] , we give bounds on the constants that arise from linear algebra in terms of the LDP parameter ε. This gives a lower bound for estimator accuracy in terms of ε (Corollary 6.2). As can be seen in Table 1 , this improves the known lower bounds for n 0 and ε 1 in two ways: first, the results from [3] , [8] only bound the worst-case error, while we give a bound for the average-case error. Even so, we give a greater lower bound for distribution estimation, and we quantify a lower bound for tally estimation. We prove tightness for a = 2, showing that our bounds are the best possible of this form that work for general a (Corollary 6.4). 
Preliminaries

Notation
For a finite set A = {1, · · · , a}, we write P A = p ∈ R A ≥0 : x p x = 1 for the space of probability distributions on A. This space is (a − 1)-dimensional, and a convenient way to parametrise it is to consider, for an x ∈ A, the space
which is diffeomorphic to
A → R ≥0 such that for each measurable subset U ⊂ P A one has
where
If this is the case, then the differential entropy of P is defined as
The definitions of continuity and of h(P ) do not depend on the choice of x ∈ A.
Privacy protocols
Let A be a finite set. A privacy protocol for A is a pair Q = (Q, B) where B is a finite set, and
is a collection of nonnegative reals such that yQ y|x = 1 for all x. We will often identify A = {1, · · · , a} and B = {1, · · · , b}, and considerQ as a (b × a)-matrix. We consider Q as a random function: for x ∈ A, we let Q(x) ∈ B be the random variable with probability distributionQ •|x , i.e. Q y|x = P(Q(x) = y). The standard way to measure the privacy of a privacy protocol is via ε-Local Differential Privacy (LDP): [12] ) Let Q = (Q, B) be a privacy protocol for A. We say that Q satisfies ε-LDP if for all x, x ∈ A and all y ∈ B one has
Intuitively, this means that for small ε, given the output y, it is difficult to decide whether the input was x or x . The smaller ε, the more privacy the protocol offers. Throughout, we make two assumptions on our privacy protocols: 1) We assume that rk(Q) = a. We do this because privacy protocols of lower rank are unable to distinguish all possible input distributions, which makes them unsuitable for frequency estimation [13] . 2) We assume that for all x ∈ A, y ∈ B one hasQ y|x > 0. If there is an y such thatQ y|x = 0 for all x, then we can remove y from B without changing the protocol. If there is an y such thatQ y|x = 0 butQ y|x , then Q does not satisfy ε-LDP for any ε. Since we are only interested in privacy protocols that offer privacy, disregarding this case is harmless. The main reason for these assumptions is that they simplify the expressions in Theorem 5.1 compared to [13] , while still being general enough to describe all protocols that are used in practice.
Setting
We consider the setting of Local Differential Privacy. There are n users, and user i has a private data item X i ∈ A = {1, · · · , a}. The aggregator publishes a privacy protocol Q = (Q, B), where we take B = {1, · · · , b} for convenience. User i calculates Y i := Q(X i ) and sends
; this is the data the aggregator has at their disposal. Note that the LDP setting differs from DP in that the users do not give the aggregator their bare private data. We consider X 1 , · · · , X n to be drawn independently from a probability distribution P ∈ P A . The probability distribution P is unknown to the aggregator as well: hence we consider it to be a random variable. The distribution of P is given by a probability measure µ on P A ; this distribution reflects the prior knowledge of the aggregator. Throughout this paper, we assume that P is continuous. If the aggregator does not have any prior knowledge, a good choice for µ is the Jeffreys prior, i.e. the symmetric Dirichlet distribution with parameter 1 2 [13] . We consider two possible goals of the aggregator: 1) The aggregator wants to know P as accurately as possible. This occurs, for instance, when the aggregator is a scientist whose userbase is a sample of a greater population. The aggregator is not concerned with this specific userbase, but rather with the characteristics of the general population, which are modelled by P . 2) For x ∈ A n and γ ∈ A, let t γ ( x) = #{i : x i = γ} and t( x) = (t γ ( x)) γ∈A . Then the aggregator wants to know the tallies T := t( X) as accurately as possible. This occurs when the users are customers of a service, and the service provider wants to know statistics about its customer base. In this paper, we assess the ability of the aggregator to estimate P and T from Y . Specifically, the aggregator has an estimator function Ψ n : B n → R A that estimates P from Y , and a Φ n : B n → R A that estimates T from Y . We use the mean squared error to measure an estimator's performance: Definition 2.2. We define the mean squared error of (Q, Ψ n ) and (Q, Φ n ) to be
Note that the dependence on µ is implicit, as µ is the probability distribution of P (and hence affects the probability distribution of T ). The metric means that the best estimator is the one that gives on average the lowest squared error, when averaging over all possible input distributions, and all possible outputs. As an alternative, one can consider the following worst-case metrics [3] , [8] : Definition 2.3. We define the worst-case MSE of (Q, Ψ n ) and (Q, Φ n to be
The 'WC bound' column in Table 1 refers to these metrics. Note that
The notation employed in this paper is summarised in Table 2 
Multivariate de Moivre-Laplace
Let r, n ∈ Z ≥1 , R := {1, · · · , r}, w ∈ P R , and let L be drawn from a multinomial distribution of n samples with probability vector w; then M := n −1 L is an element of P {1,··· ,r} . The multivariate analog of the de MoivreLaplace theorem tells us that for large n, M can be approximated by a multivariate normal distribution. We introduce two bits of notation:
is positive definite and that det(D
2 positive definite, we write N (m (j) , C (j) ) for a multivariate normal distribution on R R\{j} with mean m (j) and covariance matrix C (j) .
Theorem 2.4. (Multivariate de Moivre-Laplace [15] ) For large n and for any j, M (j) converges in probability to the discretisation of N (w
In our setting, the de Moivre-Laplace theorem surfaces when describing the distribution of S. Although S itself generally cannot be approximated by a normal distribution, we can find such an approximation for S given T .
1 For a p ∈ P A , we define
Proposition 2.5. Let p ∈ P A , and let t ∈ Z A ≥0 such that
Then for large n, P(S = s|T = t) is approximately equal to
Proof. Write M = n −1 S ∈ P B , and for
. We can write S = x S x , where for a given T = t, the random variable
follows a multinomial distribution with t x samples and probability vectorQ •|x . By Theorem 2.4, we know that for large t x the random variable
approximates a discretisation of a normal distribution
sation of a normal distribution with mean n −1 (Qt)
Substituting this in the pdf of a multivariate normal distribution now proves the statement.
Optimal estimators
We obtain our first upper bound for the MSE by giving formulas for the optimal estimators, given Q, n, µ. Essentially, this is a well-known fact about minimum mean square error (MMSE) estimators.
Theorem 3.1. Let Q, n, µ be given. TheΨ n andΦ n minimising (5) and (6), respectively, are given bŷ
Proof. For any estimator Ψ n of P one has
One has equality in (17) if and only if Ψ n ( y) x = E P [P x | Y = y] for all x and y. The proof for Φ n is similar.
Theorem 3.1 formalises the intuition in [10] , [17] that one gets better estimators by incorporating prior knowledge of the distribution. While Theorem 3.1 gives us a direct formula for the optimal estimators for a given privacy protocol, the disadvantage is that these can be 1. There is also such a description for S given P , but we will not need this. computationally difficult to evaluate. With regards to Ψ n , for x ∈ A we find that for any x we havê
sy y dp (x) .
(18) For large a, the integral over P
(x)
A can be computationally involved. One approach is to do a Monte Carlo approximation of the integral. Typically, f will be a Dirichlet distribution, for which several efficient Monte Carlo methods exist [2] , [4] . Furthermore, if the aggregator is interested in estimating P , we can give an expression for the optimal Ψ n ( y), as well as for its MSE, that does not involve any integration: Proposition 3.2. LetΨ n be as in Theorem 3.1. Let µ be a Dirichlet distribution with parameter vector α ∈ R a ≥0 . For γ ∈ A, x ∈ A n and y ∈ B n , we define
ThenΨ n ( y) γ = µ y,γ , and MSE n,µ (Q,Ψ n ) is equal to
Proof. By the proof of Theorem 9.1 of [13] we know that P | Y = y is the mixture of Dirichlet distributions. These are parametrised by x ∈ A n , have weight w x| y , and parameter vector α + t( x). The formulas forΨ n ( y) γ and MSE n,µ (Q,Ψ n ) now follow from standard formulas for the mean and variance of both Dirichlet distributions and mixture distributions.
Although in the expressions of Proposition 3.2 we sum over domains whose size is exponential in n, following [13] we see that we only need to calculate a polynomial number of terms, O(n b(a−1) ) to be precise.
Approximation by MLE
For large n, the calculation in Proposition 3.2 will still be computationally involved. However, as n → ∞,Ψ n ( y) andΦ n ( y) converge to the maximum likelihood estimators of P and T given Y = y [14] . For p we can write this as follows. Since P( Y = y|P = p) = y (Qp) 
subject to p ∈ P A .
Since the objective function is smooth and concave in p, this can be solved quickly numerically. Using the MLE rather than the posterior also has the advantage that it is independent of the choice of µ, making it a good choice of estimator when the prior is unknown. Unfortunately, the expression for P(S = s|T = t) is more complicated. However, for large n, we can approximate it via Proposition 2.5.2. As n grows larger, the t-dependence of
. Therefore, we can approximate the MLE by finding the t that solves the following optimisation problem (after choosing a y ∈ B):
Any choice of y gives the same objective function. Unfortunately, this optimisation problem is quite a bit more complicated than the one for P . However, the advantage of this approximation is that the n-dependence only surfaces in the discretisation of n −1 t ∈ P A . Furthermore, for large n we have nP ≈ T , so we can use the optimisation problem for P to get an approximate value for T . Note that our approach to approximating the MLE is different from that of [17] , as there the MLE is approximated based on a noninjective transformation of the obfuscated tallies S, rather than on S itself. This transformation is protocolspecific, and hence this method does not easily extend to general protocols. The advantage of (25) is that it can be used to improve the estimation of any protocol.
MLE experiments
We perform synthetic experiments to see how the MLE of (25) performs in practice. We apply the MLE to two well-established privacy protocols, GRR [18] and OUE [16] . Both of these are parametrised by the LDP parameter ε. We take n = 10 6 and ε ∈ [0.2, 2]. Since b = 2 a for OUE, the number of summands in (25) grows too large to handle for large a. Therefore we take a = 10 for OUE. For GRR we do not have this problem, and we take the more general setting a = 1024. We draw P from the Jeffreys prior on P A 100 times and generate a dataset of n users from it. We then randomise the data via the LDP protocol, and perform MLE on the outcome to produce an estimatê p of P ; we furthermore uset = np as an estimator of T . Finally, we measure ||P −p|| 2 and ||T −t|| 2 , and average this over all samples to determine the MSE. To calculate the MLE, we use projected gradient descent to solve (25) for OUE. For GRR, there is a direct method to findp, see Appendix A.
We compare the MLE estimator to two other estimators: First, the baseline Frequency Oracles (FO), which are affine transformations of S used to produce unbiased estimators of P and T . Second, we look at Norm-Sub, which was found in [17] to be postprocessing method of the FO outcome that gives the best MSE, among a wide selection of considered postprocessing methods. Figures 1 (GRR) and 2 (UE) show the experimental results. The simulation results show that both Norm-sub and MLE post-processing can elevate the accuracy of the results. For GRR, we see that Norm-Sub and MLE give the same accuracy. This is not unexpected, as the results in [17] show that for frequency estimation, Norm-Sub gives similar accuracy to MLE, and for GRR the MLEs defined here and in that paper are equivalent. For OUE, we see that MLE gives more accurate frequency estimations than Norm-sub when ε > 1.5.
Accuracy bounds from information theory
The disadvantage of the optimal estimators of the previous section is that their MSEs can be hard to quantify. In this section, we give lower bounds for these, based on the information-theoretical quantities h(P | Y ) and h(T | Y ). Intuitively, the lower the uncertainty about the value of P or T , the lower the average error on the estimation should be. The following Theorem quantifies this intuition.
Theorem 4.1. For any estimators Ψ n of P and Φ n of T one has
Proof. Again, we prove this only for Ψ n , as the proof for Φ n is similar. By (17) we have
The {Var(P x | Y = y)} x =x are the diagonal coefficients of the positive definite matrix Cov(P (x) | Y = y). By Hadamard's inequality we have
Furthermore, Theorem 9.6.5 of [5] shows that for all x we have
The convexity of the exponential function tells us that
Combining this with (31), (32), (33) now proves the Theorem.
Accuracy bounds from linear algebra
In the previous section, we gave a lower bound for the MSE in terms of the information-theoretical concepts h(P | Y ) and H(T | Y ). We can obtain new lower bounds for the limit case by studying the behaviour of h(P | Y ) and H(T | Y ) as n → ∞; this expands on work in [13] . The resulting lower bound is weaker not in the sense that the bound is lower, but rather that it only applies to the limit case n → ∞, rather than all n. However, the advantage is that this limit case can be formulated purely in terms of linear algebra, and as it does not depend on n, it is computationally more feasible for large amounts of users, which is typical in the LDP setting.
Before we can state the result, we first need a bit more notation. Choose a y ∈ B; for p ∈ P A we define
and constants γ µ (Q), δ µ (Q) by
While the matrix G (y) p depends on the choice of the 'distinguished' element y ∈ B, the resulting constant δ µ (Q) does not. The introduction of these constants allows us to formulate the following Theorem:
Proof. Since h(P | Y ) = h(P ) − I( Y ; P ), this follows directly from Theorem 6.7.1 of [13] . Similarly, we have
is the tally vector of Y . Start by describing the limit behaviour of I(S; T ). The limit behaviour of H(S) is given in [13, Lems. C. 4 & C.7] , so it suffices to study H(S|T ). Write M = n −1 S ∈ P B . By the proof of Proposition 2.5 we know that given T = t, M (b) is approximated by a discretisation of a multivariate normal distribution with mean
T approximates a discretisation of P for large n, this implies
Combining this with Lemmas C.4 and C.7 of [13] now finishes the proof.
It follows from this Theorem that we have the following limit behaviour of our estimator accuracy metrics.
Corollary 5.2. Let Ψ n and Φ n be as in Theorem 4.1. Then
We should interpret this as stating that at best we have MSE n,µ (Q,Ψ n ) = Ω(n −1 ), MSE n,µ (Q,Φ n ) = Ω(n) (for fixed Q and a), and we can bound the constants involved.
Accuracy bounds from ε-LDP
While the constants γ µ (Q) and δ µ (Q) do not depend on n, they still involve integration over P A , and as such can be computationally difficult for large a. However, it is possible to give lower bounds for these constants that are independent of µ, and whose Q-dependence only appears in the privacy parameter ε.
Theorem 6.1. One has
Proof. The first statement follows from Proposition 8.1 of [13] . As for the second statement, let E (y) x be as in the proof of Proposition 2.5. Note that for every x, y and p we have we have det E (y)
y=1 (Qp) y . Furthermore, since log det is concave on the space of positive symmetric matrices, we have log det
for every p. This proves the Theorem.
As a corollary of this Theorem, we find a lower bound for the MSE in terms of ε. We write f (ε)
1.
Corollary 6.2. Let Ψ n and Φ n be as in Theorem 4.1. Then for every µ one has
For n ∈ Z >0 and ε ∈ R >0 , let (Q n,ε , Ψ n,ε ) be the pair of an ε-LDP privacy protocol and an estimator for P minimising 5, and let (Q n,ε , Φ n,ε ) be the pair of an ε-LDP privacy protocol and an estimator for T minimising 6. Then as ε → 0, we have lim inf n→∞ n MSE n,µ (Q n,ε , Ψ n,ε )
lim inf n→∞ n −1 MSE n,µ (Q n,ε , Φ n,ε ) a ε 2 .
Note that these results are strictly better than what is known in the literature, to the best of our knowledge: (46) improves the result in the proof of Proposition 6 of [8] in three ways: First, our result does not just give a bound for the WSE, but also for the MSE. Also, we improve the lower bound by a factor 64. Furthermore, the result of [8] only holds for ε ≤ 1. The downside of our result, however, is that it only holds for the limit case n → ∞.
As for the results for Φ n , it follows from results in [3] that the optimal (Q, Φ n,ε ) satisfies WSE n,µ (Q, Φ n,ε ) = Ω( an ε 2 ) for small ε, but the authors do not make a statement about the constants involved. (47) improves upon this by giving a quantitative lower bound for the MSE, which itself is a lower bound for the WSE. Also, the OLH protocol from [16] performs as ≈ 4an ε 2 for large n and small ε, while our lower bound is of the form an ε 2 . Therefore, our bound is quite near to what is possible in practice.
The bound in (47) seems to imply that when looking for optimal Q, we should take b as large as possible. This seemingly contradicts results in [11] , where it is found that taking b = a is always sufficient. There are two possible explanations for this. First, it is possible that our bounds are not sharp enough to accurately detect the dependence on b; this is especially probable since (47) is only the latest in a chain of inequalities. However, the discrepancy between our results and those of [11] can also be caused by the fact that different utility metrics were being used. Whereas we focus on asymptotically many users, the utility metric in [11] looks at the KLdivergence between the probability distributions induced by the private datum of one user. It is a possibility that the optimal protocols for these different metrics do not coincide. Overall, the b-dependence of the estimation error is difficult to assess. On one hand, the 'typical' LDP protocol with b = a, GRR [18] , performs poorly for large a. The methods that are shown to perform better typically have b growing exponentially in terms of a [16] , which suggests a large b is optimal. On the other hand, we can always increase b while maintaining the same privacy and utility [13] , so a larger b does not automatically mean a better protocol.
